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McNair Scholar Program 2017
Jose Rojas-Fallas
PAPERS PLEASE: IMMIGRATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND REMMITANCES
Abstract
This research aims to analyze and present the economic reaction visible in immigrants,
unauthorized or not, in Arizona during the period in which SB 1070, a law that allowed state police officers
to stop and ask for proof of residency from anyone that the officers deemed to “have the appearance of an
immigrant”. To make the analysis on how this may have had economic implications in immigrants, an
attempt to answer how remittance activity changes in immigrant communities in the context of a change in
law enforcement jurisdiction, as seen by the SB. 1070 law enacted in Arizona is made. Immigrants
participate almost exclusively in local economies, be this because of a function of relatedness or a feeling
of safety. Policy and laws of this sort have the potential to reduce immigrant consumption and perhaps even
out-migrate from fear of the increasingly hostile surroundings they find themselves in. If they are to reduce
personal spending, local economies will see a downturn, resulting in marginal or stagnated growth. As well
as economic changes, institutional mistrust may also see an increase, creating a void of use in institutions,
signifying a misallocation, and waste of resources. This process of creating anti-immigratory policies,
although lawful, and effective in their goal, have unintended consequences with social spillover generating
harm to the general social welfare pool.
I.Introduction
Loss of jobs and stagnant wages have been historically attributed to immigrant influxes and the low
cost labor they provide. We must also account for the existent language barrier between Americans and
Mexican immigrants. This inability to immediately communicate imposes limits to interactions between
both sides. This has created resentment towards immigrants throughout the nation, bringing about tense
relationships in the general populace, without any true resolution to be expected soon. This has led to

various policies and tactics that have targeted immigrant populations such as the Legal Arizona Workers
Act (LAWA) and the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB. 1070). These have
had negative psychological effects on immigrants, and have extended to economic negative effects through
the process of outmigration.
With increasing difficulty in obtaining legal work permits or visas by Mexican immigrants through
their own government (Provine, 2013), those that find themselves in an unfortunately desperate situation
take on incredible risks, such as assailants, dangerous desert weather, American vigilantes and ultimately
Border Patrol agents and their historic record of misconduct and violence (Holmes, 2013). These migrating
agents are seeking relatively better opportunities in foreign lands; chasing the fleeting American dream.
Stricter limitations to immigrant workers, having as many as 333 immigration-related acts of legislations
on the state-level, are rationalized with discourse accusing immigrants of being a driving factor in stagnant
wages for natives or placing a higher financial burden on the host country. The present research will dive
in-depth into SB. 1070, otherwise known as “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act”
of 2010. This bill was signed into law on April 23 of that same year, and it attempted to deter illegal
immigrants from residing in Arizona through an expansion of state law enforcement officers’ ability to
enforce federal immigration law. In essence, this required state law enforcement officers to make an
unbiased, fair and justifiable assessment as to whether a suspect “appears” to be residing illegally in the
state; creating much room for xenophobic and racial discrimination to take place.
To analyze this particular situation, we must understand the immigrant background. The select
group under this research’s analysis, Mexican immigrants, can be described in broad strokes through
various identifiers: They are typically of unskilled labor occupations, medium to low completion levels of
education, and within the prime working age. These characteristics are further detailed later on in this paper.
Issues on behalf of natives arise with these individuals when labor opportunities and wage levels are
considered. Economic theory lets us know that when there is an excess supply of workers (immigrants in

this case), wages are reduced to match supply and achieve an equilibrium between labor demand and labor
supply (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2012; Orrenius and Zavodny, 2005).
Consequences of immigration and immigrant labor participation is of particular importance in a
border-state like Arizona. Being a border state, the transition of immigrants is more pronounced than other
states, and it being a border with Mexico, immigrants are typically of Mexican background, either legal or
illegal immigrants. With a total population of roughly 7 million, Latinos make up 30% of that figure, and
roughly 88% of those Latinos are of Mexican descent. This brings the estimated amount of Mexican
immigrants in Arizona close to 1.85 million. This high percentage allows for significant consequences to
take place when reacting to policies that target immigrants. And in a state like Arizona, with an infamous
reputation for battling against immigrant rights, this is of high significance to an analysis of behavioral
reaction to policies of this sort. Previous controversial policies and laws include the Legal Arizona Workers
Act of 2008, which sought to deter unauthorized labor on behalf of immigrants by mandating employers to
verify the identity and legal status of potential employees. This had visible negative effects on behavior
towards unauthorized labor, but also saw an equal impact on behavior towards authorized labor by legally
resident immigrants. This further highlights how policies of this nature have non-accounted for
consequences towards non-targets, which is something that is rarely considered in the process of creating
and discussing targeted legislation.
This research’s period of interest is a particular one. It sets its aim beginning 2006, or pre-Great
Recession, and seeks to end its data analysis in 2014. The reason for these specific years is to be explained
later on, with the main reasoning coming from economic theory; negative shocks and reactions to them.
The U.S. economy prior to 2008 was seeing positive behavior, expanding and growing, until the housingbubble popped. This negative shock was on levels not seen in recent history, with allusions of comparison
to the Great Depression of 1929. This researcher believes that this shock is of great importance because we
are able to observe a true negative shock, with great implications to labor opportunities that are typically
characterized to be labored with unauthorized workers; manual labor and “perishable” jobs. Arizona was

slow to bounce from the 2008 crash, and economic downturn theory proved to be right; blaming of
immigrants for loss of opportunity and a weak economy. A claim that is as much irrational, as it is false.
With the law under scrutiny, SB. 1070, being signed in 2010, and later viewed on legal grounds by the
Supreme Court in 2012, the time period mentioned above seems adequate to show any economic behavioral
change caused by this law.
This change in behavior on behalf of the state, has led to the following inquiry: How does
remittance activity change in immigrant communities, in the context of a change in local law enforcement
jurisdiction, as seen with SB.1070? To answer this inquiry, we must look at several key elements that are
closely related. The first, remittances and their significance. Secondly, the perception of immigration
maintained by natives of the host country; Americans in Arizona in our specific circumstance. Lastly, I
believe it most important to account for the controversial history on immigration that has given the state of
Arizona the status of trailblazer for policy like SB. 1070 and LAWA before that.
II.

Literature Review
In recent decades, remittance activity has received substantial attention from the economic

community, and have labeled it as a possible aid towards development in receiving countries. Existing
literature has provided us with several analyses of how remittances affect recipients, other than just an
additional income. Some research has provided an analysis of, and how, remittances may promote financial
development in a recipient country. By examining the link between remittances and deposits, credit
provided by the local banking sector, a positive and significant link between remittances and development
in the financial sector was found. This is at the aggregate national level, so it speaks to development on a
national level (Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Pería 2011). These benefits have also been found on a
household level (Ambrosius 2016), through usage of household data in Mexico, and self-reported usage
and knowledge of banking opportunities by remittance-receiving households, remittances improving the
use of banking services was shown. These services are basic savings accounts and credit loans, which in
economic developmental terms, are vital towards progress. But not all is positive. The possibility that

remittances have a deteriorating effect on institutions of the receiving country has been explored. Abdih et
al. (2012) tested if remittance flows have the potential to create adverse effects on the quality of institutions
in countries receiving these funds. The private characteristic of remittance inflows indicates that they are
not directly taxed, and grants a private benefit (to the recipient household). Inflows of private income
(remittances) allow for households to replace public services, such as healthcare or education, with private
equivalents. This movement away from public institutions may hamper quality, and thus, economic growth
through the public sector. Any increase in household income is beneficial to that household, and
accumulative increases in income on the national-level have the potential to aid development through
investments and savings by the private sector. The flipside is seen through the substitution of public goods
with those private ones of equal or better quality. The consensus appears to be that it is a net benefit for
recipients, with possible negative side effects that must be explored further. To understand why this specific
economic process might pose a negative connotation in the host country, it is important to explore the
institutional prejudice experienced by the host’s themselves.
Studies as to why economic uncertainty and hardships being experienced, encourage native citizens
to shift blame to that foreign and different have been undertaken, with emphasis on immigration law
reforms. Speaking towards the economic uncertainty heuristic; the rise of opposition towards immigrants
and immigration through an evaluation of influence from personally held opinions, starting with positive
and negative stereotypes that are held of groups, and then attitudes towards immigration policy was
conducted. It was found that negative stereotypes of Hispanics are highly associated with desire for a
decrease in immigration. This is explained as an association with the Hispanic demographic to immigrationblaming produced by economic uncertainty. Prejudice and economic circumstances are grand indicators of
attitudes towards immigration (Burns and Gimpel 2000). Characterized as an institutional failure, the
federal enforcement of border laws comes with a significant racial-undertone, as well as an economic
facade. In Arizona specifically, Latino immigrants have experienced discrimination based on racial and
prejudice factors historically. An explanation of the systematic error in pursuing enforcement of

immigration law through appearance-based criteria is provided as a failure of historical and generational
inheritance (Provine 2013).
Perception of immigration and immigrants is of great importance to remittance activities. Freund
and Spatafora (2008) tell us that the most important determinants in remittance magnitudes are informality,
transaction costs, and stock of immigrants in the region. Informality is used to illustrate the upward trend
of total remittance magnitudes in recent decades, explained by the preference of formal means and
institutions, choosing to move away from informal channels. Transaction costs are important when talking
about worldwide remittances, but the relative low-cost of remittances intended for Mexico make this a
negligible factor in the current research. The stock of immigrants’ criteria is the most crucial when talking
about immigration, these policies seek to deter and decrease any further immigrants from settling in their
state.
The above mentioned laws have sought to deter immigration through employment opportunities
and restricting movement of immigrants. Research guided towards labor market effects has shown that
Mexican migrants have suffered from a negatively shifting perception of the immigration process. Through
an analysis of wages shifts and employer treatment, as of the 21st Century, employers’ have begun treating
Mexican migrants with the same precaution, and disdain, regardless of legal status. This in part is explained
by the increase in audits and raids that cause employers to become more risk averse when hiring immigrants.
Legal Mexican immigrants have begun to suffer from prejudice towards unauthorized immigrant workers
(Donato and Sisk, 2012).
On a more detailed analysis, Ellis et al. (2014) expand on the out-migration factor of policies of
this sort, giving an in-depth focus to the Legal Arizona workers Act (LAWA) in 2008. Where outmigration
appears to be the only alternative for non-citizen Hispanic immigrants in Arizona.. By conducting an
analytical comparison of out-migration patterns for Arizona, Nevada, California and Florida; comparable
states, they show that out-migration of foreign-born Latino non-citizens was higher each year in Arizona
than these “control” states. The group most vulnerable to the effects on the labor market produced by

LAWA - non-citizen foreign-born Latinos - abandoned Arizona at higher rates than other demographic
groups.
Further analyzing specific policy, Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman (2017) present us with monthly
observations of the consequences caused by SB. 1070. In where the period between March 2010 and July
2010, saw a significant decrease in immigrants entering Arizona. Not accidentally, this period corresponds
with when SB. 1070 was signed and set to go into effect on July 29, 2010. These periods help to paint the
behavioral response picture of what occurred in response to SB. 1070.
With all relevant previous literature analyzed, I find that there is a gap in the direct connection
between remittance activity and policies like SB. 1070, which target immigrants. The previous literature
does an exceptional job at making clear what effects remittances have on a receiving household and a
developing economy. Tied to this is the general immigration prejudice experienced by immigrants in a host
country, such as Mexican immigrants in Arizona. No direct tie has been made, to the knowledge of this
researcher, of the effects produced by SB.1070 on remittance behavior, only research focused on outmigration behavior has been conducted. I seek to conduct a theoretical-analysis of the effects on remittances
caused by SB. 1070, focusing on interpretation of previous relevant literature and relying on economic
theory to explain the observed adverse effects. There will be little to no reliance on data manipulation, as
this has been done by the reviewed literature pertaining to migration patterns when experiencing a shock
which the likes of these laws cause. I do not seek to determine the reactivness or magnitude with which
remittances are affected, but rather show, through analytical theory, that such a thing does occur and is not
accounted for.

III.

Theory
Immigrants possess several characteristics that can be attributed to their decision to migrate with

confidence. The most important ones being age, education, distance from destination, and family migration.

Age is the primary and most important factor; the younger the individual, the longer their initial investment
has time to mature and increase. It is also vital for this study to acknowledge the existence of a prime
working age (16-45). This age overlaps with creation of households and obtaining independents that will
increase the likelihood to remit, if traveling alone. Education is the biggest determinant of who will mobilize
within an age group. Obtainment of employment is largely determined by the individual’s educational
background. Distance helps to signal the initial costs of migrating. This is important because we see a
negative relationship between costs and flow of immigrants. The psychological cost of change also rises
with distance. Family migration is the most relevant factor in our discussion. The decision to move is taken
only if the family will experience a net increase in benefits and total earnings. If the head of the household
is to migrate, they will only do so if the potential gains will benefit the rest of the household even in their
absence. These benefits in absence come in the form of remittances (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2012).
When speaking on established economic theory, we find our focus directed towards several key
insights of thought on immigration and labor. I shall begin with the theory as to why immigrants decide to
migrate. Human capital theory views mobility as an investment, one which sees costs being stomached in
the early periods in expectation of greater returns over time. Mobility is paramount to human capital theory
because it predicts that migration will flow from areas of relatively low earnings and possibilities to areas
in where opportunities are superior (relative to the current subjective context). The positive or negative
status of these opportunities carry a personal bias and the judgment is based largely on economic factors.
These factors live both in the current period (the cost of moving), and future periods (perceived gains)
(Ehrenberg & Smith, 2012).
When faced with uncertainty and risk; forced removal, or deportation, these fears stem from
perceived migratory-status driven discrimination. This distress has the potential to demotivate even legal
permanent residents. This happens because there may be unauthorized immigrants that belong to the legal
residents’ household. If we are to see this discrimination as a negative shock affecting our economic agents,

then economic theory tells us that we have a more than decent probability at seeing a decrease in economic
activity on behalf of all involved.
Authorized immigrants have begun to feel the effects of prejudice on behalf of native citizens. This comes
hand-in-hand with the resentment harbored towards unauthorized immigrants, and the labor they provide.
So much so, that legal Mexican residents are being treated by employers as if their immigration status was
not of legal standard. This has the potential to bring about unforeseen economic consequences; legal
residents are experiencing negative shocks to their socio-economic situation. (Donato and Sisk, 2012). The
internal outmigration (movement from one state to another) rate for foreign-born, noncitizen Latinos saw
an increase during this period (Ellis et al., 2014). This group can be analyzed as a proxy because it is the
group most likely to account for unauthorized immigrants. We can further detail this group if we are to
specify for age (16-46) and education (high school completion or less) as done by Bohn, Lofstrom, and
Raphael (2014). If we are to state that the magnitude of remittances depends on the stock of immigrants as
done by Freund and Spatafor (2008), then we can look at immigration policy that affects the currently
observed economic activity, remittances, as a factor of internal outmigration. What we are analyzing is a
policy created with an intended target in mind; unauthorized immigrants. But the crux of this research
question is to show that there are unaccounted side effects to legal foreign-born noncitizen Latinos. I do
believe that federal border laws should be enforced, but this method does not appear to be the most
economically sound way to address the issue at hand. This anti-immigration rhetoric is partly fueled by a
pervasive thought that vacated job opportunities will go to native citizens, something not observed in any
previous study (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2012).
We also have to account for difficulties in obtaining legal work permits or visas. This is exacerbated
by difficulties experienced on the other side of the border. Obtaining these legal documents requires for the
immigrant to go through extremely lengthy waiting periods in Mexico. This makes a difficult situation even
tougher, as immigrants seeking to migrate are doing so because of difficult times in their country of origin
(Provine, 2013).

IV.

Discussion
With an overview of relevant economic theory, and with the addition of previous literature

pertaining to the topic at hand, we can confidently claim that policies of this sort impact remittance behavior
negatively. Through out-migration figures of non-citizen/foreign-born Hispanic immigrants in Arizona, the
magnitude of remittances will decrease. Adding to this is the psychological costs and risk-averse behavior
being adopted by those deciding to remain in the state, even if their legal status is fit to do so.
It would seem that foreign born Hispanic immigrants located in Arizona are not held to
contemporary economic thought and theory of labor. There is no compensating differentials in wages for
immigrants, evidenced by the shift in behavior from employers towards Mexican labor. Given our focus of
a specific demographic cohort; those who would be more likely to be economic immigrants who participate
in the remittance market, wages are not truly compensated for the type of labor they are most likely to
engage in. Rather, there is a negative premium on the wage of an unauthorized immigrant, based solely on
legal status. This negative premium comes into play for foreign born Hispanic immigrants that are residing
in Arizona in a legal manner. As mentioned before, employers have shifted towards practicing
precautionary employment of Mexican labor, regardless of legal status. This has a significant implication
for wages and income on behalf of immigrants likely to remit. As noted before, the stock of immigrants is
a significant determinant of remittance magnitude, the same can be said of income and household
remittances. It should come off as common sense that remittances do not equal 100% of income; those
remitting must also purchase food, pay rent, invest in transportation and participate in many things we all
do regularly, no matter how frugal their needs may be. Through analyzing data provided by the economic
summary of Phoenix (U.S. BLS, Consumer Expenditure Survey), we can confidently claim that roughly
18% of annual income is left for “other” economic activity. If we are to assume that everyone shares the
same basic needs (i.e. food, transportation, healthcare, etc.) then immigrants are left with 18% of their
income to remit; not to claim that it is the whole 18% being remitted. All of this is leads to the conclusion

that any decrease, or “short-changing” of wages for Hispanic immigrants has a direct impact on householdremittance magnitude.
Although not terribly relevant to the current research, employers have also violated some economic
theory, caused by SB. 1070 and bills similar to it. It is necessary to say that SB. 1070 has caused mostly
psychological problems and only relatively minor economic ones. This is explained by the high
effectiveness of the Legal American Workers Act of 2008 in limiting unauthorized labor in Arizona, as
well as authorized immigrant labor. The theory being disturbed is that of profit motive. In where employers
care little for practicing discrimination, and focusing solely on profits. However we can say that those
employers not engaging in discriminatory practices receive an advantage over their counterparts (Cowen &
Tabarrok, 2011).
V.

Conclusion
Border laws and federal immigration laws are enforced and mandated for national security reasons.

The form in which they are enforced on the other hand, is of concern. “The Support Our Law Enforcement
and Safe Neighborhoods Act” or SB.1070 of Arizona, created a tense atmosphere not only in the state, but
nationwide. The political trend of anti-immigration seems to surface cyclically, being activated by
economic downturn.
Through the previous analysis of established and relevant literature, we know that out-migration
increased during the months in which SB.1070 was to go into effect (Hoekstra and Orozco-Aleman, 2017).
And showed diminishing increases immediately afterwards. If I am to follow the insight providced by Freud
and Spatafora (2008), this increased out-migration signals relative decrease in remittances. We saw the
same effects when the Legal American Workers Act went into law 2 years prior. This occurrence, created
by very similar laws, signals to us that they are effective in their duty; determent of immigrant migration
and participation in Arizona labor markets. They also carry unintended consequences, which have not been
considered, or at worst, intentionally overlooked by policy makers. We also catch a glimpse of what these

unintended consequences are, remittances decrease, and this is known through the sheer logic of there being
fewer foreign born Hispanics in the state of Arizona; our demographic group of interest. These “missing”
economic agents cause an immediate deficit in local economies. These pushed out immigrants are not
replaced by incoming native citizens. Rather, a void is created. This does not happen overnight of course,
but the unattractiveness radiating from a legislative decision as this, creates a deficit in economic activity.
Lost jobs are not flipped over to native citizens, either by lack of labor supply or by simple turnover lag
periods.
In this scenario, I believe that everyone loses. Be it economically or any other of the human
psychological factors we carry with us every day. This negative social impact does not end with
unauthorized immigrants.
Legal immigrants, authorized to work, also suffer from these laws. They are not the intended target
of this policy, but their innate relatedness and similarities causes them to be targeted regardless. More
importantly, these legal residents are more likely to continue participation in the state, and this loss of
confidence in legal institutions will have negative impacts on behavior. These established, legal residents
are more likely to also be financially secure. Signaling that their economic activity would be more constant,
something that would be greatly affected by a negative shock, such as would be produced by tensions raised
with SB. 1070 going into law.
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